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ARTICLE 
"THE [JUDICIAL] BEATINGS WILL 
CONTINUE UNTIL MORALE IMPROVES": 
THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA OF COOPERATIVE 
DISCOVERY AND PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVED MORALE 
By: The Honorable Paul W. Grimm! & Heather Leigh 
Williams2 
INTRODUCTION 
Judges, courts, legal institutions, and legal commentators long have 
stressed the value of cooperative discovery. Through judicial 
rulings, sanction awards, the creation of local rules and discovery 
guidelines, and the formation of aspirational documents designed to 
promote cooperation, courts and legal commentators have attempted to 
drill the value of cooperation in the discovery process into the hearts 
and minds of litigants and their counsel. While the judicial beatings 
are likely to continue until morale improves, some thought should be 
devoted to why morale is low on the cooperation front and what 
efforts can be made to improve it. 
In this article, we argue that cooperative discovery, a concept 
promoted by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the local rules of a 
number of United States District Courts, case law, and legal 
scholarship, presents a prisoner's dilemma: Despite the fact that it is in 
the best interest of parties and their counsel to cooperate in the 
discovery process, they largely fail to do so. When the discovery 
game becomes iterative-that is, when it is played over and over again 
1 The Honorable Paul. W Grimm is a United States District Judge for the United 
States District Court for the District of Maryland. Judge Grimm received a B.A., 
summa cum laude, from the University of California, Davis, and graduated magna 
cum laude from the University of New Mexico School of Law. Judge Grimm retired 
as Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Army Reserve. He has written numerous books 
and articles on civil procedure, evidence, and trial practice, and currently serves as 
an adjunct faculty member at the University of Baltimore and University of 
Maryland Schools of Law. The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors 
themselves, and do not purport to be those of the federal judiciary, or of the United 
States District Court for the District of Maryland. 
2 Heather Leigh Williams received a B.A. from the University of Rochester, and 
graduated cum laude from the University of Maryland School of Law. Ms. Williams 
had the privilege of serving as the law clerk to the Honorable Paul W. Grimm in 
2011-2012. She currently practices in Maryland state and federal courts. 
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by the same players-the actors' conduct may shift, becoming more or 
less cooperative depending on the nature of the interactions, and the 
success of efforts at cooperation over time. Many factors, whether 
institutional, strategic, or attitudinal, may dissuade a party or its 
counsel from cooperating. We consider these factors throughout this 
article, proceeding as follows: In Part I, we explain the prisoner's 
dilemma theory and provide a brief background of game theory and its 
application to the legal field. In Part II, we outline the theory that 
cooperative discovery presents a prisoner's dilemma. In so doing, we 
identify and describe conceptions of cooperation in the American 
discovery model and consider, with the help of examples drawn from 
the case law, how this model creates a prisoner's dilemma for its 
participants. In Part III, we consider ways to move beyond the 
prisoner's dilemma, offering suggestions for ways that our discovery 
model may be tweaked so that its participants are no longer trapped 
inside the game's boxes. 
I. THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA 
The so-called prisoner's dilemma, as originally imagined by Merrill 
Flood and Melvin Dresher in 1950, and named by A.W. Tucker soon 
thereafter,3 involves a scenario where two prisoners, separately 
detained and under questioning or interrogation, must decide whether 
"to stay silent or to squeal on their confederate."4 More generally, the 
prisoner's dilemma is used as a model to describe any "game"S in 
which "two parties acting individually wind up with an outcome worse 
for both of them than the outcome that they could obtain through 
cooperation. "6 
3 ROBERT AxELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 216 (rev. ed. 2006). 
4 Steven Gensler, Some Thoughts on Lawyer's E-Volving Duties in Discovery, 36 N. 
Ky. L. REv. 521, 551 n.171 (2009) (citing John K. Seatar, The Barrister and the 
Bomb: The Dynamics o/Cooperation, Nuclear Deterrence, and Discovery Abuse, 69 
B. U. L. REv. 569,578 (1989». 
S The prisoner's dilemma is one of many models in the field of game theory. See 
ROGER B. MYERSON, GAME THEORY: ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT 1 (1997); DOUGLAS G. 
BAIRD, GAME THEORY & THE LAW 1 (1994). Game theory provides a mechanism 
for understanding how rational, self-interested individuals interact with each other. 
Id. A "game" is played "whenever the fate of an individual in [ a] group depends not 
only on his actions but also on the actions of the rest of the individuals in the group." 
KEN BINMORE, ESSAYS ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF GAME THEORY 1 (1990). 
6 Setear, supra note 4, at 578; see also AxELROD, supra note 3, at 7 (explaining that 
the basic problem in the prisoner's dilemma "occurs when the pursuit of self-interest 
by each leads to a poor outcome for all"). 
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The basic model for the prisoner's dilemma is represented by the 
following figure and framed as follows: Two players (the column 
player and the row player) each have two choices-cooperate or 
defect. 7 Each player must decide whether to cooperate or defect 
simultaneously and independently, without knowing what the other 
player will do.8 The results of those choices are displayed in the 
figure's matrix: Both players could cooperate, resulting in each player 
doing equally and fairly well, as represented by the value of three 
shown in the figure. 9 That value could be a dollar payoff, or a benefit 
of some kind incurred over the other player.lo In the traditional 
conception of the prisoner's dilemma, the numerical values represent 
the number of years each player would spend in jail. \I Alternatively, 
either player could defect while the other player cooperates. 12 In that 
scenario, the defecting player obtains the game's highest possible 
payoff (five), while the non-defecting player gets nothing-the so-
called "sucker's payoff.,,13 Lastly, both players could defect, resulting 
in each obtaining an equal, but smaller, payoff.14 
Column Player: 
Row Player: Cooperate Defect 
Cooperate 3,3 0,5 
Defect 5,0 1, 1 
The strategic problem presented by the game is this: If both players 
cooperate, each player undoubtedly is better off than if both players 
defect. IS However, it is in each player's individual self-interest to 
defect, regardless of what that player thinks the other player will do. 16 
Why? If the row player cooperates, the column player obtains a 
higher payoff by defecting (five versus three). If the row player 
defects, the column player again obtains a higher payoff by defecting 
(one versus zero). As a result, regardless of what the column player 
7 AXELROD, supra note 3, at 7-8. 
8 AxELROD, supra note 3, at 7-8. 
9 AXELROD, supra note 3, at 8. 
10 AxELROD, supra note 3, at 8. 
\I AxELROD, supra note 3, at 8. 
12 AXELROD, supra note 3, at 8. 
13 AXELROD, supra note 3, at 8. 
14 AxELROD, supra note 3, at 8. 
IS See Julia Y. Lee, Gaining Assurances, 2012 WIS. L. REv. 1137, 1142 (2012). 
16 See id. 
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thinks the row player will do (cooperate or defect), it is in the column 
player's interest, from a purely payoff-focused perspective, to defect. 17 
But, the same rationale applies for the row player too. From the row 
player's perspective, which is equally focused on individual payout, 
the best choice is to defect. 
Thus, both players, acting only in their own self-interest and 
focused only on obtaining their own optimal payouts, are motivated to 
defect. 18 Unfortunately for everyone involved, the result of mutual 
defection is that both players get a payout of one, which is worse than 
the payout of three that they could have gotten by both cooperating. 19 
The focus on individual interest and payouts leads to a worse outcome 
for both players than could be achieved through cooperation. 
Game theory, and specifically the prisoner's dilemma, has long 
been applied to the legal field. In recent years, the prisoner's dilemma 
has been used to understand the choices made by litigants and their 
attorneys in various phases of litigation, from alternative dispute 
resolution20 to the decision to oppose a motion for summary judgment 
filed by a co-party.21 As other commentators have pointed out, parties 
and attorneys involved in discovery often end up in a prisoner's 
dilemma, with each side using discovery abusively in anticipation that 
the other party will do the same.22 We add to this discussion by 
considering the discovery dilemma in the context not only of abusive 
discovery, but another frequent problem is evasive and non-responsive 
discovery. We also consider how the discovery game changes over 
iterations, meaning in multiple games played by the same players. 
Finally, we offer suggestions for tweaking our discovery model so that 
its participants can step outside of the game's boxes. 
17 AXELROD, supra note 3, at 9. 
18 Lee, supra note 15, at 1142. 
19 AxELROD, supra note 3, at 9. 
20 See, e.g., DONALD G. GIFFORD, LEGAL NEGOTIATION: THEORY AND ApPLICATIONS 
25-26 (1989). 
21 See, e.g., Jonathan A. Wolfson, Warring Teammates: Standing to Oppose a Co-
Party's Motion/or Summary Judgment, 60 DRAKE L. REV. 561, 570-72 (2012) 
(using the prisoner's dilemma to understand a party's decision to oppose a motion 
for summary judgment filed by a co-party in the context of antitrust, tort, and civil 
rights cases). 
22 See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Party Rulemaking: Making Procedural Rules Through 
Party Choice, 90 TEX. L. REv. 1329, 1355 (2012); Ronald 1. Gilson & Robert H. 
Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in 
Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 509, 514-15 (1994); Seatear, supra note 6, at 584-86. 
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II. COOPERATIVE DISCOVERY AS A PRISONER'S DILEMMA 
A. Cooperative Discovery 
Cooperative discovery is an approach to discovery endorsed by 
numerous judges throughout the country, and embodied in documents 
such as the Sedona Conference's 2009 Cooperation Proclamation.23 
The goal of the Cooperation Proclamation is to ensure zealous 
advocacy and decrease litigation costs through cooperation, 
collaboration, and transparency in the discovery process.24 The notion 
of discovery as a cooperative, rather than a combative, endeavor is 
articulated clearly by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
encourage counsel to coordinate and cooperate throughout the 
discovery process. For example, under Rule 26(f), the parties are 
directed to confer as early as possible in the litigation to discuss 
potential issues and develop a proposed discovery plan.25 Under Rule 
26( c), any motion seeking a protective order must be accompanied by 
a certification that the moving party in good faith has conferred, or 
attempted to confer with opposing counsel, to resolve the dispute 
without court intervention.26 Likewise, under Rule 37(a), any motion 
to compel discovery or disclosure must be accompanied by a 
certification of good faith.27 As a general matter, Rule 37 authorizes 
sanctions for failure to cooperate in discovery, although without 
explicitly defining what cooperation means or requiring it in the text 
of the rule itself.28 
Beyond the provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that 
encourage conference and cooperation in discovery, many United 
'States District Courts have implemented local rules addressing 
cooperation. For example, "in the interest of reducing delay and 
expense," the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
Illinois mandates that counsel coordinate to create "cooperative 
discovery arrangements. "29 The District Court for the District of· 
Massachusetts encourages "cost effective discovery by means of 
23 The Sedona Conference, The Sedona Conference Cooperation Proclamation, 10 
SEDONA CONF. 1. 331 (2009) [hereinafter Cooperation Proclamation]. 
24 I d. 
25 FED. R. Crv. P. 26(f)(1). 
26 See FED. R. Crv. P. 26(c)(1). 
27 FED. R. Crv. P. 37(a)(I). 
28 See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 37. 
29 S.D. Ill. R. 26.l(d). 
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voluntary exchange of information among litigants and their 
attorneys," and recommends both formalized discovery stipUlations, as 
well as "informal, cooperative discovery practices in which counsel 
provide information to opposing counsel without resort to formal 
discovery procedures."30 
In several districts, the Local Rules announce the Court's 
expectations with regard to discovery. In the District Courts for the 
Eastern and Southern Districts of New York, "counsel are expected to 
cooperate with each other, consistent with the interests of their clients, 
in all phases of the discovery process and to be courteous in their 
dealings with each other, including in matters relating to scheduling 
and timing of various discovery procedures.'m The Districts of 
Oregon and Wyoming feature nearly identical rules, with the District 
of Oregon adding that the Court "may impose sanctions if it finds that 
counsel has been unreasonable in not accommodating the legitimate 
requests of opposing counsel.,,32 Where attorneys' fees are applicable, 
"the Court may take a lack of cooperation into consideration in setting 
the fee.'») 
The District Court for the District of Maryland has further 
expounded upon the notion of cooperative discovery in its detailed 
Discovery Guidelines.34 The Guidelines provide that all "parties and 
counsel have an obligation to cooperate in planning and conducting 
discovery to tailor the discovery to ensure that it meets [the 
Guidelines'] objectives [of satisfying the Federal Rules' goals of 
proportionality and the just, speedy, and inexpensive conduct of 
discovery]."35 Under the Guidelines, "counsel have a duty to confer 
early and throughout the case as needed to ensure that discovery is 
planned and conducted consistent with these requirements and, where 
necessary, make adjustments and modifications in discovery as 
30 D. Mass. R. 26.l(a). 
31 See generally E.D.N.Y. Civ. R. 26.4; S.D.N.Y. Civ. R. 26.4. The Local Rules in 
the Eastern and South Districts of New York (which are identical) also offer a 
helpful way of thinking about the common problem of evasive or non-responsive 
discovery responses: "Discovery requests shall be read reasonably in the recognition 
that the attorney serving them generally does not have the information being sought 
and the attorney receiving them generally does have such information or can obtain 
it from the client." E.D.N.Y. Civ. R. 26.4(b); S.D.N.Y. Civ. R. 26.4(b). 
32 D. Or. R. 83.8(b); D. Wyo. Civ. R. 83.3. 
33 D. Or. R. 83-8(b). Even ifnot embodied in a specific rule, many courts do this. 
34 See generally D. Md. Loc. Adm. R., App'x A, Discovery Guidelines [hereinafter 
Discovery Guidelines]. 
35 Id., Guideline 1.a. 
2013] Judicial Beatings 113 
needed."36 The court encourages counsel, during their consultation, 
"to think creatively and to make proposals to one another about 
alternatives or modifications to the discovery otherwise permitted that 
would permit discovery to be completed in a more just, speedy, 
inexpensive way."37 Moreover, 
[a ]ttorneys are expected to behave 
professionally and with courtesy towards 
all involved in the discovery process, 
including but not limited to opposing 
counsel, parties and non-parties. This 
includes cooperation and civil conduct in 
an adversary system. Cooperation and 
civility include, at a minimum, being open 
to, and reasonably available for, 
discussion of legitimate differences in 
order to achieve the just, speedy, and 
inexpensive resolution of the action and 
every proceeding. Cooperation and 
communication can reduce the costs of 
discovery, and they are an obligation of 
counse1.38 
With regard to discovery disputes, the Guidelines reaffirm Rule 
37(a)'s requirement that, whenever possible, "attorneys are expected 
to communicate with each other in good faith throughout the discovery 
process to resolve disputes without the need for intervention by the 
Court, and should do so promptly after becoming aware of the grounds 
for the dispute."39 
Cooperative discovery is not just an aspirational notion contained 
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the accompanying local 
rules of many federal district courts. Instead, it is a notion actively 
demanded by judges throughout the country. For example, the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas has 
acknowledged that "the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and [various] 
Rules of Professional Conduct-not to mention the various codes of 
civility-contemplate cooperation among counsel during the discovery 
36Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id., Guideline l.d. 
39 Id., Guideline 1.£. 
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process."40 According to the Arkansas court, such cooperation 
"manifestly includes responding to telephone calls and other 
communications" of opposing counsel.41 Where parties fail to 
cooperate, it adds to the cost of litigation and leads to "escalating 
vexation and imbroglios."42 Similarly, the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of California noted in a recent case that 
counsel's failure to provide prompt disclosures regarding the scope 
and nature of their cases and defenses, and their corresponding failure 
to cooperate to define the counters of appropriate discovery, "threatens 
the fair and cost-effective exchange of relevant discovery."43 As the 
United States District Court for the District of Maryland has stated, the 
cost of discovery is "widely criticized as being excessive-to the point 
of pricing litigants out of court. "44 
Cooperative discovery is particularly important in cases involving 
extensive discovery of electronically stored information ("ESI"), 
where the sheer amount of information to be retrieved, sorted, and 
processed complicates discovery and increases the costs of litigation, 
as does the need to retain experts who are well-versed in generating 
ESI search terms, retrieving information from ESI, and converting ESI 
into a useable and manageable format.45 As the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of New York has noted, cases 
involving ESI particularly require "cooperation between opposing 
counsel and transparency in all aspects of preservation and 
production," especially with regard to generating and testing keyword 
searches with the assistance of the ESI's custodians.46 Thus, in the 
federal court's view, "the best solution in the entire area of electronic 
discovery is cooperation among counsel. "47 This view is endorsed by 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(1), which requires that the parties 
meet and confer with an eye t9wards developing a plan for producing 
40 Baptists Health v. Smith, 393 F. Supp. 2d 719,721 (E.D. Ark. 2005). 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Oracle USA, Inc. v. SAP AG, 264 F.R.D. 541, 543 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
44 Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354,359 (D. Md. 2008). 
45 Paul W. Grimm et al., New Paradigm for Discovery Practice: Cooperation, MD. 
BJ. 26, 28 (Nov.lDec. 2010). 
46 William A. Gross Constr. Assocs., Inc. v. Am. Manuf. Mut. Ins. Co., 256 F.R.D. 
134, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
47 Id. (explicitly and strongly endorsing The Sedona Conference Cooperation 
Proclamation). 
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any discoverable ESI, a process that cannot occur without 
cooperation.48 
In an older case, the Seventh Circuit reminded its bar that the real 
victims of uncooperative discovery are the parties.49 The record in the 
case, Sweat v. Peabody Coal CO.,50 reflected "a discovery phase in 
which the parties' respective counsel were combative, obstinate, and 
wholly uncooperative in the process of exchanging information 
pertinent to the litigation."51 Plaintiff's counsel claimed that the 
defendant was "continuously dragging its feet, refusing to comply with 
various discovery requests," while defense counsel complained that 
Plaintiffs demands were unrealistic and that Plaintiffs counsel 
"declined to be flexible concerning the scheduling and timing of [the 
defendant's] compliance."52 The Court noted that this was the latest in 
a string of discovery disputes, stating that, from the record, it was 
unable to "discern whether either party possesses a monopoly on the 
contumacious conduct displayed" throughout discovery. 53 The Court 
was not "happy with the progress, or should say lack of progress, 
relating to getting this case ready for trial."54 It was apparent to the 
Court that counsel in the case did not like each other, would not get 
along, and would not cooperate in discovery. "The people who suffer 
when this happens," the Court stated bluntly, "are the parties."55 
From the above discussion, there seem to be many reasons for 
counsel to engage in cooperative discovery, including direction from 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the local rules of many 
federal district courts and the guidance of judges across the country. 
Moreover, it seems to be widely understood that failure to engage in 
cooperative discovery is likely to increase the costs, and_complexity, 
of litigation to the detriment of everyone involved.56 Why, then, is 
cooperative discovery not more widely practiced by litigants and their 
attorneys? 
48 See FED. R. Crv. P. 26(f) (discussing the material to be included in a discovery 
plan). 
49 See Sweat v. Peabody Coal Co., 94 F.3d 301 (7th Cir. 1996). 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 306. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Sweat, 94 F.3d at 306. 
56 Cooperation Proclamation, supra note 27, at 361. 
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B. The Cooperative Discovery Dilemma 
Cooperative discovery presents a prisoner's dilemma for various 
institutional, attitudinal, and strategic reasons. Each party anticipates 
or expects that the other party will approach discovery 
uncooperatively, or engage in discovery that is abusive or evasive, and 
so responds in kind.57 The "fear of being disadvantaged if the other 
side were to take a non-cooperative approach to discovery" often leads 
both sides to reject cooperation, despite the fact that approaching 
discovery cooperatively could reduce overall discovery expense for 
both sides, while still allowing each party to obtain essential 
information to which it is entitled.58 
The cooperative discovery dilemma may be attitudinal. It has long 
been thought that discovery should be a game, where players stall, 
obfuscate, and contest all discovery and produce only that which they 
cannot find an excuse for withholding. 59 Cooperation and courtesy to 
opposing parties and their counsel has been seen as weakness, which 
has been taken advantage of by dilatory, evasive, or abusive tactics of 
less cooperative or courteous counsel. As a result, cooperation and 
courtesy is discouraged to the disadvantage of all. 
Likewise, the dilemma may be the result of strategy. A party or 
their counsel may perceive that it could obtain a strategic advantage 
over the opposing party by "employing obstructionist, overreaching or 
combative tactics," potentially limiting the opponent's ability to obtain 
needed and discoverable information, while itself "reaping the benefits 
of receiving full discovery from its more cooperative opponent."60 
Aware of this perception, both sides end up adopting a non-
cooperative approach as a defensive strategy, so that neither side 
benefits from a "unilateral advantage" over the other.61 Unfortunately, 
when these "hardball discovery"62 tactics are used, both parties end up 
worse off, with the failure to cooperate prolonging discovery and 
generating unnecessary expense, and with neither party gaining the 
strategic high ground. 
57 Bone, supra note 26, at 1355. .' 
58 The Sedona Conference, The Case for Cooperation, 10 SEDONA CONF. 1. 339, 361 
(2009) [hereinafter Case for Cooperation]. 
59 Grimm, supra note 53, at 27. 
60 Case for Cooperation, supra note 66, at 361. 
61 See generally Cooperation Proclamation, supra note 27. 
62 Network Computing Servs. Corp. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 223 F.R.D. 392, 395 (D.S.C. 
2004). 
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In a recent case, the United States District Court for the District of 
South Carolina encountered a common example of the cooperative 
discovery dilemma when calculating the lodestar amount for purposes 
of awarding attorney's fees to a prevailing plaintiff.63 The court 
characterized the underlying merits of the case as straightforward. 
The Plaintiff, a company in the business of designing and creating 
newsletters for multi-unit apartment and residential complexes and 
franchise businesses, brought suit against an employee for 
misappropriation of trade secrets and confidential information.64 At 
trial, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff company and, shortly 
thereafter, the plaintiff moved for, and was awarded, attorney's fees.65 
Despite the straightforward nature of the claim, the court noted that 
the parties, from the initiation of the lawsuit, set about making the 
litigation "as complicated, onerous and time-consuming as possible."66 
In reviewing the plaintiff s time records, submitted in support of its 
requested fee award, the court found that the company "spent an 
inordinate amount of time on unnecessary and/or duplicative 
motions," including discovery motions, and noted that "the docket 
reveals that the parties often initiated or opposed motions on matters 
which most litigants resolve by consent, including motions for 
extensions of time."67 Likewise, the parties refused to participate in 
cooperative discovery, "resorting to filing competing motions to 
compel and/or motions for protective orders."68 A significant amount 
of time was devoted to a dispute among the parties regarding the 
breadth and scope of e-discovery in the case.69 The court 
acknowledged that discovery of ESI may inteIject "an element of 
complexity into an otherwise routine matter."70 However, rather than 
resolving their e-discovery issues by collaborating and cooperating 
with their respective experts, "each party held steadfast in their 
positions concerning the scope of electronic discovery without 
compromise which needlessly increased" litigation costS.71 The court 
made clear that the disputes related to e-discovery, and the parties' 
63 Uhlig, LLC v. Shirley, No. 6:08-cv-01208-JMC, 2012 WL 4478365, at *1, *5 
(D.S.C. Sept. 25,2012). 
64 I d. at *1, *4. 
65 I d. at *2-3. 
66 I d. at *4. 
67Id. at *5. 
68 I d. 
69 See Uhlig, LLC, 2012 WL 4478365, at *5. 
70 !d. 
71 !d. 
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motions requesting broader discovery, in the end, "did not materially 
impact the case" in any way.72 
Ifwe were to evaluate this case in terms of the prisoner's dilemma, 
the case might be summarized in the following figure. (Recall that in 
the traditional prisoner's dilemma, the payoff values represented years 
in jail. Here, the payoff values represent some strategic benefit that 
would be obtained by each party, so that the goal is to obtain the 
highest payoff value possible.) 
Defendant 
Employee: 
Cooperate and 
collaborate 
with opposing 
experts to 
develop ESI 
plan 
Refuse to 
cooperate and 
collaborate 
Plaintiff Company: 
Cooperate and 
collaborate Refuse to 
with opposing 
cooperate and 
experts to 
collaborate develop ESI 
plan 
3,3 0,5 
5,0 1, 1 
Thus, were both parties to cooperate and coordinate with opposing 
counsel and their experts to develop an ESI plan, both would obtain 
necessary and discoverable information at less expense, resulting in an 
equally good payoff of 3 for both parties. However, apparently stuck 
on the notion that discovery is a game involving obfuscating, stalling, 
and contesting wherever possible, neither party cooperates, refusing to 
offer their ESI experts for collaboration and refusing to coordinate 
with the opposing party's experts. This notion is grounded, at least in 
part, on fear that one-sided cooperation, unreciprocated by the 
opposing side, leaves a party vulnerable, having provided too much 
information, and not obtaining equally candid responses or 
information in return, as represented by the 5-0 and 0-5 values. The 
72 Id. 
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result of mutual non-cooperation is a smaller payoff of 1 for both 
parties, where that lower value represents the additional costs incurred 
in requesting, obtaining, sorting, and processing voluminous ESI. 
The figure could be modified to show payoff values that represent 
costs incurred by each party in pursuing discovery. In that instance, 
the figure would appear as follows, and each party's aim would be to 
obtain necessary and discoverable information through the discovery 
process while incurring the smallest cost possible. Thus, were both 
parties to cooperate to limit the scope of ESI and to develop the best 
search terms, the costs of requesting, producing, obtaining, reviewing, 
sorting, and processing ESI for each party might be approximately 
$3,000. However, out of fear of providing opposing counsel with 
access to their experts and/or search terminology without obtaining the 
same in return (as represented by the $5,000-$1,000 value and the 
$1,000-$5,000 value, where the party that does cooperate ends up 
giving opposing counsel cheaper and easier access to its material, 
while not obtaining the same benefit), both parties end up not 
cooperating and, consequently, spending more on e-discovery. 
Defendant 
Employee: 
Cooperate and 
collaborate 
with opposing 
experts to 
develop ESI 
plan 
Refuse to 
cooperate and 
collaborate 
Plaintiff Company: 
Cooperate and 
collaborate with Refuse to 
opposing experts cooperate and 
to develop ESI collaborate 
plan 
$3,000; $3,000 $1,000; $5,000 
$5,000; $1,000 $7,000; $7,000 
In the case described above, the court reduced the plaintiffs 
requested fee award by sixty percent, based in part on the excessive 
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amount of time devoted to discovery.73 In doing so, it noted that much 
of the infonnation obtained through e-discovery "did not materially 
impact the case."74 Cooperation by counsel could have ensured that 
discovery was more narrowly tailored and limited to the matters at 
issue in the case, thereby significantly decreasing the costs and burden 
of production.75 Instead, the parties' inability to coordinate with their 
respective experts with regard to ESI resulted in both parties spending 
more money to request and produce discovery, the results of which 
were largely immaterial to the final disposition of the case. 
The problem of non-responsive, evasive answers to discovery 
requests likewise present a classic prisoner's dilemma. Experience 
shows that non-specific, boilerplate objections to discovery requests, 
and non-responsive, evasive answers, are all too commonplace and 
pose a serious barrier to conducting discovery in a timely and cost-
efficient manner, as they tend to generate motions to compeP6 Take 
the following scenario: A Scheduling Order is issued in a federal case, 
and discovery requests are promptly served by both parties. Were 
both parties to provide responsive, non-evasive answers to the 
discovery requests and/or specific, non-boilerplate objections-as the 
Federal Rules plainly require77-both parties would obtain an equally 
good payoff of 3. Even if motions to compel are necessary, the cost of 
litigating such motions will be substantially decreased, as the parties 
already will have outlined their objections in detail, allowing the 
opposing party to promptly raise their counterpoints and enabling the 
court to make a prompt decision.78 However, because experience in 
practice has led many lawyers to believe that the opposing side will 
present only evasive, incomplete, and non-responsive answers and/or 
boilerplate objections to their discovery requests, and because strategic 
or attitudinal considerations may enforce that belief, both sides are 
likely to defect, resulting in a lower payoff for both parties (as 
73 I d. at *7, *10. 
74 I d. at *5. 
75 Paul W. Grimm, The State 0/ Discovery Practice in Civil Cases: Must the Rules 
Be Changed to Reduce Costs and Burden, or Can Significant Improvements Be 
Achieved Within Existing Rules?, 12 SEDONA CONF. J. 47, 60 (2011). 
76 See generally Mancia, 253 F.R.D. at 362. 
77 FED. R. CIV. P. 33(b)(4) (interrogatories); Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(B) (document 
requests); D. Md. Loc. R. 104.6; Hall v. Sullivan, 231 F.R.D. 468,470 (D. Md. 
2005); Thompson v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 199 F.R.D. 168,173 (D. 
Md. 2001); Marens v. Carrabba's Italian Grill, Inc., 196 F.R.D. 35,38-39 (D. Md. 
2000). 
78 Case/or Cooperation, supra note 66, at 343. 
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represented by the 1-1 payoff).79 The motivation to defect is enhanced 
by the fear (represented by the 5-0 and 0-5 payoffs) that the provision 
of responsive, non-evasive answers and non-boilerplate objections by 
one party will provide the opposing party a strategic advantage, 
assuming the same kinds of responses are not provided in return. 80 
Indeed, where one party provides responsive, non-evasive answers and 
non-boilerplate objections, the cost of the opposing party litigating any 
motions to compel arising from the discovery responses is likely to be 
smaller than if the first party had provided evasive answers and 
boilerplate objections.81 
Party 1: 
Provide 
responsive, 
non-evasive 
answers and 
non-boilerplate 
objections to 
Party 2: discovery 
requests. 
Provide 
responsive, non-
evasive answers 
and non- 3,3 
boilerplate 
objections to 
discovery 
requests 
Provide non-
responsive, 
evasive answers 
and boilerplate 5,0 
objections to 
discovery 
requests 
79 See Case for Cooperation, supra note 66, at 361. 
80 Case for Cooperation, supra note 66, at 361. 
81 Case for Cooperation, supra note 66, at 343. 
Provide non-
responsive, 
evasive 
answers and 
boilerplate 
objections to 
discovery 
requests 
0,5 
1, 1 
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Thus, a number of possible factors may dissuade cooperation. 
Another example of an instance in which cooperative discovery often 
breaks down is where one party is proceeding in an action without 
legal representation.82 Given the complexity of the rules governing 
discovery, and the likelihood that a pro se party has no legal training, 
frustrations commonly arise on both sides, with the pro se litigant 
often feeling abused or overburdened by the opposing side's discovery 
requests, and opposing counsel experiencing frustrations related to the 
insufficiency, or lack entirely, of discovery responses.83 It is not 
uncommon, additionally, for pro se litigants to become frustrated by 
objections raised to their discovery requests, even legitimate, non-
boilerplate objections, due to a lack of familiarity with legal jargon or 
rules. 84 As a result, the pro se party may be predisposed against 
cooperation, while the party proceeding with counsel may have its 
own apprehensions regarding cooperation with a pro se litigant, 
leading both parties to choose defection and antagonism over 
cooperation and courtesy, to the detriment of all. 
It may be that the notion that discovery, and particularly e-
discovery, is a prisoner's dilemma is, as Maura Grossman noted in a 
recent article, a self-fulfilling prophesy, "with the effect of 
incentivizing counsel for either party to engage in bad behavior, in the 
belief that it is the rational choice under the circumstances."85 
Regardless of the precision with which each unique discovery dispute 
will fit into the squares of the prisoner's dilemma, the perception that 
opposing counsel is likely to engage in bad discovery behavior, and 
82 Calhoun v. Robinson, No. C08-5744 RJBIKLS, 2009 WL 3326760, at *5 (W.D. 
Wash. Oct. 13,2009) ("Contention may defeat cooperation and effective discovery 
and this process may be exacerbated when one party is pro se."). See generally, e.g., 
Adams v. Sharfstein, No. CCB-II-3755, 2012 WL 2992172 (D. Md. July 19,2012). 
83 See, e.g., Adams, 2012 WL 2992172, at *6 (noting a pro se Plaintiffs request that 
the Court oversee all discovery in the case based on her perception that defense 
counsel was using discovery against her in an abusive fashion); Dancy v. Univ. of 
N.C. at Charlotte, No. 3:08-CV-166-RJC-DCK, 2009 WL 2424039, at *1 (W.D.N.C. 
Aug. 3,2009) (noting the defendant's frustration with the pro se plaintiffs failure to 
respond to various discovery requests). 
84 See Adams, 2012 WL 2992172, at *6. 
85 Maura R. Grossman, Some Thoughts on Incentives, Rules, and Ethics Concerning 
the Use o/Search Technology in E-Discovery, 12 SEDONA CONF. J. 89, 97 (2011) 
(explaining that, in e-discovery, several elements of the basic prisoner's dilemma are 
missing: (1) the requirement that each party make an "irrevocable choice of strategy" 
without knowledge of the other party's choice; (2) the requirement that bad behavior 
on the part of one party reduces the impact of another party's bad behavior; and (3) 
the requirement that the game be played only once). 
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the counterbalancing incentive to do the same, poses a real problem 
toward achieving cooperative discovery. 
III. STEPPING OUTSIDE THE BOXES 
In 2008, the United States District Court for the District of 
Maryland opined that while "judges, scholars, commentators and 
lawyers themselves long have recognized the problems associated with 
abusive discovery, what has been missing is a thoughtful means to 
engage all the stakeholders in the litigation process-lawyers, judge 
and the public at large-and provide them with the encouragement, 
means and incentive to approach discovery in a different way."86 
While strides have been made in recent years to provide such 
encouragement and incentives, continued engagement with the topic 
of facilitating cooperative discovery remains necessary. 
The discovery "game" can be ended, and the prisoner's dilemma 
solved, in a number of possible ways, all geared toward encouraging 
and facilitating cooperation among the parties and their counsel. First, 
unlike in the classic prisoner's dilemma, where the actors' choices are 
made alone, and without supervision and guidance, discovery occurs 
in a context where an "intervening enforcement authority" may 
promote cooperation over defection.8? Of course, trial judges cannot 
possibly hear and decide every possible discovery dispute that arises 
among parties and counsel, given high caseloads and other limitations 
on their time. 88 Instead, early and proactive judicial management of 
discovery may provide a solution.89 A number of studies conducted 
and commentaries made in recent years, including those undertaken by 
the American Bar Association90 and the Institute for the Advancement 
of the American Legal System,91 have concluded that "the most 
86 Mancia, 253 F.R.D. at 363. 
8? See Case for Cooperation, supra note 66, at 362. 
88 Gensler, supra note 4, at 535-36; The Case for Cooperation, supra note 66, at 343. 
89 The Sedona Conference, The Sedona Conference Cooperation Proclamation: 
Resources for the Judiciary, 9 (Aug. 20 11) [hereinafter Resources for the Judiciary]. 
90 See generally ABA SECTION OF LITIGATION MEMBER SURVEY ON CIVIL PRACTICE: 
DETAILED REPORT (2009), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/contentldamlaba/migratedllitigation/survey/docs/report 
_ aba _ report.authcheckdam.pdf. 
91 See generally IAALS, 21 ST CENTURY CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A ROADMAP FOR 
REFORM: PILOT PROJECT RULES (2009), available at 
http://www.actl.comlamltemplate.cfm?section=home&template=/cmlcontentdisplay. 
cfm&contentid=4509; lAALS, 21 ST CENTURY CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A ROADMAP 
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effective way to control litigation costs is for a judge to take charge of 
the case from its inception and to manage it aggressively through the 
pretrial process by helping shape, limit, and enforce a reasonable 
discovery plan," and by keeping the case on a strict schedule to ensure 
that disposition of the matter is as expeditious as possible.92 
Thus, judges could control discovery, and preemptively limit 
discovery disputes and foster cooperative discovery, by issuing, along 
with their standard Scheduling Order, a Discovery Order that will 
guide discovery in each case. The purpose of such a Discovery Order 
is not to change the party-driven nature of discovery.93 Rather, as the 
Sedona Conference has explained, active case management "provides 
a strong framework in which the parties should develop and execute 
their own cooperative discovery plans.,,94 Discovery Orders would 
operate to provide "a clear set of expectations" that push "the 
evidence-gathering phase of the litigation forward in a speedy and 
inexpensive way, without the cost, delay, and gamesmanship 
associated with unmanaged discovery."95 The following types of 
guidelines could be put into place by such an Order, all of which 
together should have the impact of eliminating needless discovery 
disputes and encouraging the parties to confer and cooperate 
throughout discovery: 
• Early Disclosure of Damages Claims and Relief Sought. 
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1), judges 
may direct any party asserting a claim against another party to 
serve on that party and provide to the Court information 
relating to the calculation of damages and a particularized 
statement regarding any non-monetary relief sought. In 
requiring that such disclosures be made early in the litigation, a 
judge encourages the parties to focus on what is directly at 
issue in the case and to consider the proportionality of their 
discovery requests vis it vis the ultimate relief sought. With 
such information identified early, the parties are more likely to 
FOR REFORM: CASE FLOW MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES (2009), available at 
http://www . uscourts.gov luscourtslRulesandPolicies/ruleslDuke%20MaterialslLibrar 
yIIAALS,%20Roadmap%20for%20Reform,%20Civil%20Caseflow%20Managemen 
t%20Guidelines.pdf. 
92 Grimm, supra note 86, at 49. 
93 Resources for the Judiciary, supra note 101, at 4. 
94 Resources for the Judiciary, supra note 101, at 4. 
95 Resourcesfor the Judiciary, supra note 101, at 4. 
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cooperate, particularly because any later requests for attorney's 
fees relating to time spent conducting discovery or engaging in 
discovery disputes will be measured against what is at stake in 
the case.96 
• Phased Discovery. Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure 26(b)(2)(C) and 26(g)(1)(B)(ii)-(iii), a judge may 
direct the parties to conduct discovery in phases, thereby 
eliminating many preliminary disputes regarding the scope of 
discovery, allowing the parties to obtain essential information 
early in the case so that later requests may be more narrowly 
tailored and less likely the subject of objection and dispute, and 
saving time and cost. A phased approach to discovery might 
proceed as follows: In the first phase, the parties are directed to 
focus on those facts that are most essential to resolving the 
case-whether by trial, settlement, or dispositive motion. 
Thus, the parties may seek any non-privileged, non-work 
product information that is likely to be admissible under the 
Federal Rules of Evidence and that is material to proof of 
claims and defenses raised in the pleadings. By na,rrowing the 
scope of information that is discoverable in Phase 1 to exclude 
information that might otherwise be discoverable under the 
broad scope of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1), a 
judge encourages the parties to focus on what is most essential 
to their claims and defenses. 
In the second phase, upon a showing of good cause, the parties 
may be permitted to seek the information contemplated by 
Rule 26(b)( 1 )-any non-privileged, non-work product 
information that is relevant to the claims and defenses pleaded 
or more generally to the subject matter of the litigation. The 
necessary showing of good cause must demonstrate that any 
additional discovery undertaken in Phase 2 will be proportional 
to the issues at stake in the litigation, taking into consideration 
96 See, e.g., Oracle, 264 F.R.D. at 543 (stating that "the Court has repeatedly 
emphasized that the scope of this case required cooperation in prioritizing discovery 
and in being mindful of the proportionality requirement of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26," and noting that counsel's failure to provide prompt disclosure of their 
damages claims and "failure to cooperate on defining the contours of appropriate 
discovery .... threaten[ed] the fair and cost-effective exchange of relevant 
discovery" in the case). 
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the costs already incurred in Phase 1 and the factors stated in 
Rule 26(b )(2)(C)(i)-(iii). If additional discovery is pennitted 
in Phase 2, the party seeking such discovery may be required to 
show cause as to why it should not be ordered to pay all or a 
part of the cost of the additional discovery sought. 
Phased discovery facilitates cooperation by eliminating 
variables that tend to dissuade cooperation. Where the scope 
of discoverable infonnation is phased and limited, parties must 
be reflective, and will be discouraged from issuing the kind of 
overbroad, unlimited discovery requests that tend to lead to 
disputes and generate additional costs. Further, where the cost 
of additional discovery in Phase 2 is presumed to be imposed 
on the party seeking such additional discovery, that party is 
less likely to engage in any game play. Indeed, judges who 
have ordered phased discovery have found that the parties 
rarely return for Phase 2.97 Instead, the parties cooperate to 
identify what questions should be asked, what infonnation 
must be gathered, and the most efficient means of obtaining it. 
• Impact of Failing to Cooperate. A Discovery Order may 
provide that the failure of a party or counsel to cooperate 
throughout discovery will be relevant to resolving any 
discovery disputes, including whether the Court will pennit 
discovery beyond Phase 1, and if so, who will bear the cost of 
that additional discovery. Likewise, an Order may provide that 
whether a party or counsel has cooperated during discovery 
will be relevant in detennining whether sanctions should be 
imposed when ruling on discovery motions. 
• Limitations on Filing Discovery Motions. Despite the good 
faith certificate requirement stated throughout the federal 
discovery rules, experience has shown that parties nonetheless 
fail to confer and cooperate prior to filing discovery motions, 
or at least fail to do so in any meaningful fashion. Thus, a 
Discovery Order might require the parties to request a 
telephone conference with the Court prior to filing a discovery 
motion, with an aim toward resolving the dispute infonnally 
and fostering a cooperative spirit among counsel. Only where 
97 Grimm, supra note 86, at 60. 
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the request for a conference is denied, or where the conference 
fails to resolve the dispute, will a motion be permitted. 
• Effect of Boilerplate Objections and Evasive, Non-
Responsive Answers to Discovery Requests. Pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(4), the judge may 
remind counsel and the parties in a Discovery Order that any 
boilerplate objections to discovery requests and/or any evasive, 
non-responsive answers to discovery requests will be treated as 
a failure to answer and/or will result in waiver of the 
objections. A significant amount of time, energy, and expense 
is spent in motions practice related to a party providing 
responses to discovery requests that are evasive and non-
responsive, or that contain boilerplate, nonspecific objections.98 
A reminder about the impact of boilerplate objections and 
evasive answers is likely to facilitate cooperation, particularly 
as sanctions may be. awarded for the failure to answer, and 
cooperation in discovery is a factor to be considered III 
determining the nature and amount of such sanctions. 
• Production of ESI. A Discovery Order may dictate that the 
parties are to cooperate to develop search methodology and 
criteria that will achieve proportionality in ESI discovery, 
including the appropriate· use of computer-assisted search 
methodology. This may require coordination with the 
opposing party's ESI experts. Where such cooperation is 
dictated, the parties may be less likely to attempt to hide the 
ball with regard to search methodology development. 
Additionally, a Discovery Order may limit the scope of ESI 
discovery, eliminating the possibility of the kind of cooperative 
breakdown discussed above. For example, a judge may order 
that, absent a showing of good cause or stipulation by the 
parties, a party from whom ESI is requested will not be 
required to search for responsive ESI: (1) from more than ten 
key custodians; (2) that was created more than five years 
before the lawsuit was filed; (3) from sources not reasonably 
accessible without undue burden or cost; or (4) for more than a 
98 See, e.g., Lynn v. Monarch Recovery Mgmt., Inc., 285 F.R.D. 350 (D. Md. 2012); 
Mezu v. Morgan State Univ., 269 F.R.D. 565 (D. Md. 2010); Corsair Special 
Situations Fund, L.P. v. Engineered Framing Sys., Inc., 694 F. Supp. 2d 449 (D. Md. 
2010); Sabol v. Brooks, 469 F. Supp. 2d 324 (D. Md. 2006). 
128 
• 
University of Baltimore Law Forum [Vol. 43.2 
set number of hours, exclusive of time spent reviewing the ESI 
determined to be responsive for privilege or work-product 
protection, provided that the producing party can demonstrate 
to the court and its adversary that the search was effectively 
designed and efficiently conducted. 99 
Agreements Regarding Non-Waiver of Attorney-Client 
Privilege or Work Product Protection. A Discovery Order 
may further encourage cooperation during discovery by 
requiring that the parties consider whether the costs and 
burdens of discovery, especially discovery of ESI, may be 
reduced by entering into a non-waiver agreement pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Evidence 502(e). To the extent that the Court 
adopts the parties' agreement as a Court Order, it will limit 
waiver in any other state or federal proceeding, 100 which 
should have the effect of calming counsel's nerves regarding 
inadvertent disclosure and thereby facilitating cooperation. In 
addition, the Order may encourage the parties to discuss 
whether to use computer-assisted search methodology to 
facilitate pre-production review of ESI to identify information 
that is beyond the scope of discovery because it is attomey-
client privileged or work product protected material. 
A number of courts have adopted local rules that address 
cooperative discovery, acknowledging that "[w]hen the parties and 
lawyers know at the outset what the court expects, and that if they fail 
to behave accordingly, they will suffer meaningful adverse 
consequences, they are far more likely to fall into line. "101 While 
99 See Ronald 1. Hedges, The Sedona Conference Points the Way Toward Control of 
the Costs and Burden of E-Discovery, 59 FED. LAW. 46,47 (Jan.lFeb. 2012) (stating 
that cooperation in e-discovery may be achieved by: "using internal ESI discovery 
'point persons' to assist counsel in preparing requests and responses; exchanging 
information on relevant data sources, including those not being searched, or 
scheduling early disclosures on the topic of ESI; jointly developing automated 
search and retrieval methodologies to cull relevant information; promoting early 
identification of form or forms of production; developing case-long discovery 
budgets based on proportionality principles; and considering the use of court-
appointed experts .... to resolve discovery disputes."). 
100 Fed. R. Evid. 502(d). For more on rule 502, see generally Paul W. Grimm, Lisa 
Yurwit Bergstrom & Matthew P. Kraeuter, Federal Rule of Evidence 502: Has It 
Lived Up to Its Potential?, 17 RICH. 1. L. & TECH. 8 (2011). 
101 Grimm, supra note 86, at 61. 
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individual judges may issue Discovery Orders, or may make judicial 
rulings regarding cooperative discovery, formalizing the requirement 
that discovery be cooperative in a local rule reinforces the uniformity 
of the requirement among the judges of a given court and establishes a 
court-wide expectation for litigants and their attorneys that is not 
likely to be ignored. l02 These local rules may take a number of forms, 
as illustrated above. As Professor Steven Gensler has noted, local 
rules that elaborate on duties established by the Federal Rules tend to 
be particularly helpfuL 103 For example, where local rules elaborate on 
what is required in the Rule 26(f) conference, lawyers who read the 
local rules "will be hard pressed to argue that they did not fully 
appreciate the scope of issues they are required to discuss and about 
which they are required to pursue agreement in good faith."104 And for 
some lawyers, the "extra guidance might be genuinely educationaL"los 
Likewise, rules that encourage cooperation more broadly may "help 
lawyers better appreciate their cooperation duties or lead lawyers to 
give increased thought to the benefits of voluntary cooperation. "106 
As the foregoing reveals, a variety of options are available to 
judges and courts in their quest to encourage and facilitate 
cooperation. It seems, however, that no matter the amount of judicial 
encouragement, in the form of judicial rulings, local rules, or 
discovery orders, or even in the form of allegedly deterrent sanctions 
orders, real change must begin with the parties themselves, and with 
their counseL How can parties and their counsel be encouraged to 
stop playing the "discovery game" and move toward cooperative 
discovery? 
Game theory teaches us that iterative games-those played 
repeatedly over time-tend to generate cooperation, rather than 
defection, as the players are forced to consider how cooperation or 
defection in one instance will impact their payoffs in the future.107 
Thus, when the discovery game is iterative, the conduct of parties and 
their counsel may shift, becoming more or less cooperative, depending 
on how cooperative the opposing side was in the past. 108 Where a 
102 See Grimm, supra note 86, at 61. 
103 Gensler, supra note 4, at 374. 
104 Gensler, supra note 4, at 373. 
105 Gensler, supra note 4, at 373. 
106 Gensler, supra note 4, at 374. 
107 See, e.g., Case/or Cooperation, supra note 66, at 361; Grossman, supra note 96, 
at 97. 
108 David Hyman, When Rules Collide: Procedural Intersection & Rule o/Law, 71 
TuL. L. REV. 1389, 1426 (1997) ("Discovery .... is a two-way street, and at least 
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party has been burned in the past, they are less likely to choose 
cooperation with the offending party or person. I09 Where, however, 
experience with an opposing party or an opposing counsel has, in the 
past, been cooperative, facilitating discovery at a lower cost, everyone 
involved is likely to choose cooperation. llo Of course, some games 
may never be iterative: A party may encounter an opposing party or an 
opposing counsel only once (particularly where the opposing party is 
pro se), and so that discovery game will never benefit from the 
cooperation engendered by mUltiple interactions, unless a party or 
attorney's capacity for cooperation becomes a part of the reputation 
that proceeds them, and the party or attorney is committed to 
maintaining that reputation. 11I However, where a party appears or an 
attorney practices regularly in a particular court, the same kind of 
iteration-created cooperation may occur, as parties or attorneys would 
benefit, over time, from being favorably viewed by the court as 
cooperative. I 12 
Both attorneys and their clients may need to make an attitude 
adjustment when it comes to cooperating in discovery. For some 
clients, who approach litigation with a "kill or be killed" strategy, 
cooperation may be a tough sell. ll3 Attorneys should be prepared to 
explain the value of cooperation to their clients: The failure of a party 
to cooperate in discovery "may trigger non-cooperative conduct" from 
the opposing party, thus prolonging discovery and generating 
unnecessary expense. I 14 Uncooperative conduct could "lead to an 
adverse decision or sanctions" in any future discovery disputes. I IS 
Cooperative discovery therefore is in the client's best interests as it is 
"likely [to] result in less production, fewer court filings," lower costs, 
has the potential to proceed as a classic iteratiy~ prisoner's dilemma, with the parties 
tailoring their requests and responses based on their perception of how the other side 
is behaving."). 
109 See Cat Casey, A Game Theorist Perspective on E-Discovery, HUDSON LEGAL 
BLOG: DISCOVERY IN PRACTICE (Feb. 21, 2012), http://hudsonlegalblog.comJe-
discovery/game-theorist-perspective-e-discovery.html. 
II 0 See Seatear, supra note 4, at 616, 619. 
III See Case for Cooperation, supra note 66, at 361. 
112 See Case for Cooperation, supra note 66, at 362 ("Indeed, that attorneys will 
again appear before the courts, and their clients may as well, creates a dynamic in 
which the threat of future obstructionist conduct by opponents, or risk of gaining a 
reputation among the judiciary as unduly combative during discovery, encourages 
[ cooperation]. "). 
113 Grimm, supra note 53, at 31. 
114 Grimm, supra note 53, at 31. 
liS See Grimm, supra note 53, at 31. 
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and a more favorable position in any future disputes. 116 For attorneys 
needing an attitude adjustment, a number of helpful materials have 
been provided and are being developed by The Sedona Conference 
and other institutions, which are designed to educate attorneys about 
the value of cooperation and to develop tools and suggest techniques 
for facilitating cooperative discovery.117 With regard to attorneys, it 
makes sense that a change in attitudes toward cooperative discovery 
should begin in law schools. 118 While law schools generally have not 
focused on discovery practice outside of 1 L Civil Procedure courses,119 
a shift in attitudes within legal education is beginning to surface, as 
more law schools offer courses in practical litigation skills.120 These 
courses should lay the groundwork for future cooperative discovery by 
training the next generation of lawyers in the skills necessary to 
facilitate and achieve such discovery. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Cooperative discovery has been stressed by judges, courts, legal 
institutions, and legal commentators through judicial rulings, sanction 
awards, local rules and discovery guidelines, and aspirational 
documents, praising the value of such cooperation for years. 
Nonetheless, cooperation in discovery remains lacking in many 
instances. One explanation for this phenomenon is that cooperative 
116 See Grimm, supra note 53, at 31. 
117 See, e.g., Sedona Conference Webinar, Cooperation Guidance/or Litigators & 
In-House Counsel (June 7, 2011), available at 
https:llthesedonaconference.org/conference/20 11 I cooperation -guidance-litigators-
house-counsel. See generally Cooperation Proclamation, supra note 27, at 332-33 
(noting intent to develop and distribute "toolkits to train and support lawyers, judges, 
other professionals, and students in techniques of discovery cooperation, 
collaboration, and transparency," components of which will include "training 
programs tailored to each stakeholder; a clearinghouse of practical resources, 
including form agreements, case management orders, discovery protocols, etc.; 
court-annexed e-discovery ADR with qualified counselors and mediators, available 
to assist parties of limited means; .... [and] law school programs to train students in 
the technical, legal, and cooperative aspects of e-discovery"). 
118 Grimm, supra note 86, at 58. 
119 See Grimm, supra note 86, at 58. 
120 For example, at the University of Baltimore School of Law, a course is offered in 
Discovery Practice & Procedure, which focuses on best practices and proposals for 
reform of discovery under the state and federal rules of civil procedure. The law 
school also offers an Electronic Evidence and Discovery Workshop. See Univ. of 
BaIt. School of Law, Elective Courses, http://law.ubalt.eduiacademics/jd-
prograrn/courseofferings/electivecourses.cfm (last published Jan. 4, 2013). 
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discovery presents a prisoner's dilemma for attorneys and litigants. In 
this Article, we have presented a number of suggestions for stepping 
outside of the prisoner's dilemma's boxes. These suggestions include 
proactive judicial case management in the form of Discovery Orders 
designed to provide a clear set of expectations for cooperation and to 
create deadlines and obligations that facilitate cooperative behavior, 
the institution of local rules and discovery guidelines by courts, and 
attitudinal adjustments for attorneys and their clients. Where the rules 
that govern the prisoner's dilemma game are taken away, by adding an 
intervening enforcement authority that encourages and facilities 
cooperation among the players, encouraging players to consider the 
iterative nature of the litigation game, and encouraging attitudinal 
shifts from the ground up, we may achieve cooperative discovery after 
all. 
